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Paul Marginson, Keith Sisson* 
European Works Councils - Opening the Door to European 
Bargaining?** 
Are European works councils the first step on the road to European level 
collective bargaining? Factors against this view include the Directive's limitation to 
information rights, the existence of a clear demarcation between information and 
bargaining in many EU countries, the national focus of most European unions, and 
the increasingly divisionalised structure of companies. Nevertheless, as product 
markets become more internationalised, multinationals develop more international 
employee management systems, and unions seek cross- border comparisons of 
employee rights and benefits, there are real pressures towards a form of ‘arms-
length’ bargaining at European level. In this the parties do not formally negotiate at 
the European level, but they do influence and anticipate each other's at national 
level.   
 
Sind europäische Betriebsräte ein erster Schritt auf dem Weg zu Kollektiv-
verhandlungen auf europäischer Ebene? Gegen diese Sichtweise sprechen folgende 
Faktoren: die in der EU-Richtlinie vorgenommene Begrenzung auf Informations-
rechte; die klare Abgrenzung zwischen Information und Kollektivverhandlungen in 
vielen europäischen Ländern; das nationale Interesse der meisten europäischen 
Gewerkschaften; sowie die häufig nach Sparten gegliederten Unternehmens-
strukturen. Gleichwohl werden mit der weiteren Internationalisierung der 
Produktmärkte in vielen multinationalen Unternehmen transnationale Systeme der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen entstehen und die Gewerkschaften zunehmend grenzüber-
schreitende Vergleiche von Arbeitsnormen und Arbeitnehmerrechten vornehmen. Es 
gibt folglich einen realen Druck in Richtung „indirekter Kollektivverhandlungen“ auf 
europäischer Ebene. Nach diesem Verständnis verhandeln die Parteien zwar nicht 
formal auf europäischer Ebene, sondern beeinflussen sich gegenseitig und 
antizipieren ihre jeweiligen Reaktionen auf nationaler Ebene. 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
* Paul Marginson is Professor of human resource management and employment relations at the 
University of Leeds, and Keith Sisson is Professor of industrial relations and Director of the 
Industrial Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick Business School. 
** This article was first published in „European Works Councils Bulletin“, Issue I, January/ 
February 1996. 
 English Abstract: DM, deutsches Abstract: WMJ 
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Are European Works Councils the first step on the road to European-level 
collective bargaining? Examining the forces for and against such a development, Paul 
Marginson and Keith Sisson argue that, although management fears and union 
aspirations in this area are unlikely to be realised in the foreseeable future, they do 
contain an important grain of truth. 
In the debate surrounding the implementation of the European Works Council 
Directive, one of the key concerns articulated by management has been that EWCs 
could represent a significant step along the road towards European collective 
bargaining. Such concern reflects aspirations on the trade union side that, in 
conjunction with growing international integration of production within companies 
themselves and the prospect of Economic and Monetary Union, European Works 
Councils will provide a platform eventually leading to European company-level 
bargaining. This is because they provide a structure within which trade union 
representatives from different European countries can meet, exchange information 
and potentially forge common negotiating positions.  We argue that whilst, for the 
foreseeable future, such fears and aspirations are unlikely to be realised, they do 
contain an important grain of truth. We begin with an examination of the forces 
which stand in the way of any development of collective bargaining at the European 
level, before considering the factors which are likely to promote activity at this level. 
In conclusion, we suggest that the most likely outcome is the development of „arms-
length“ bargaining, in which negotiations continue to be conducted through existing 
industry and enterprise structures at national and sub-national level, but where the 
positions of the parties are increasingly coordinated across European borders an 
outcomes are increasingly similar. 
Impediments to European collective bargaining 
There are a range of institutional factors and social and economic forces which 
stand in the way of European-level collective bargaining. 
The first factor is the Directive itself, which expressly limits the scope of EWC's 
to the purposes of provision of information to, and rights to consultation for, 
employee representatives at European level. Reflecting the Directive's intentions, 
none of the 80 or so agreements concluded to date under Article 13 of the Directive 
provide employees or their representatives with any rights to negotiation over matters 
within the ambit of the EWC. The managements concerned have successfully 
demarcated information and consultation from collective bargaining. In practice too, 
none of the multinational companies with established EWC arrangements have 
negotiated collective agreements at European level. The nearest to an exception is 
Danone, the French-based food group, which has agreed a series of joint texts with 
employee representatives at European level covering a number of industrial relations 
issues (see box), which provide a framework for negotiations at lower levels of the 
group.  
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Second, the demarcation of rights to information and consultation from those to 
collective negotiation in the EWC Directive, reflects a basic distinction between 
employee-based structures for consultation, at enterprise and group level, and trade 
union-based structures for collective bargaining, at either sectoral, regional or 
national level, entrenched in the industrial relations systems of mainland European 
countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Even in the Nordic countries 
such as Sweden, where rights to information and consultation at enterprise and group 
level are trade union-based, employers have successfully demarcated consultation 
within the enterprise from collective negotiations at sectoral and intersectoral level. In 
the UK, in the absence of any general statutory right to information and consultation 
and negotiation management has been remarkably successful over recent years in 
(re)defining both the level and scope of collective negotiations.  Overall, it seems 
improbable that management which has successfully enforced such a demarcation 
between consultation and collective negotiation over several decades, will prove 
unable to do so at European level in the coming period.  
Thirdly, many European trade unions too remain wedded to national systems of 
collective bargaining, involving an acceptance of the established demarcation 
between consultation within the enterprise and collective negotiations beyond. Thus, 
although the ETUC and the European industry federations of trade unions may aspire 
to promote the coordination of bargaining demands across countries through EWCs, 
national trade unions may well prove reluctant to yield the necessary authority, or 
resources, to enable these European-level organisations to pursue a common 
negotiating agenda in different European countries. The problems encountered at the 
beginning of the decade by unions in the metal sector in launching and sustaining a 
common initiative to reduce working hours, faced with differing national priorities 
and circumstances, testify to the difficulties involved.  
A fourth significant factor is the rationale of the devolved or „divisionalised“ 
management systems adopted, and increasingly extended, by most of Europe's large 
companies. These involve devolution of responsibility for operating matters and 
financial performance, in profit and loss terms, to quasi-autonomous business 
divisions. Increasingly, such devolution is being carried further to smaller, „strategic“ 
business units, so that large European companies are now made up of a number of 
profit-responsible strategic business units linked together in divisions or „streams“. 
The logic of devolving operational and financial responsibility is that unit-level 
management should, as far as possible, be in a position to determine their own costs - 
including labour costs - and revenue. This calls into question collective bargaining at 
higher levels (sectoral, regional or intersectoral) because its role runs counter to this 
logic of devolved financial responsibility.  Also important are the pressures leading to 
the adoption of these operationally and financially devolved management systems: 
the intensification of international competition, characterised by greater uncertainty 
and rapid shifts in demand; accelerated rates of product innovation; and the 
progressive opening up of regional and international markets. Devolved management 
systems are a means of transmitting these competitive pressures on large companies 
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to the individual business units, and of making them more responsive to them - 
thereby enhancing the adaptive capability of the larger company to changing market 
circumstances. In these circumstances, managements have sought to develop and 
strengthen employment systems which are organisation- as distinct from occupation- 
or industry-based, as a means not only to exercise greater control over costs, but also 
to develop working arrangements which provide them with the adaptiveness they 
require. Increasingly, therefore, managements have been pressing to introduce 
employment and work practices which are tailored to their own business 
requirements. Such bespoke arrangements are difficult to cater for in higher 
agreements at any level, let alone the European.  The result of such pressure to give 
business unit management greater control over labour costs, and the autonomy to 
determine the working arrangements which best suit the needs of the business, has 
been a marked growth in the incidence of collective bargaining within the enterprise, 
either at company or at workplace level. In many European countries, this has taken 
the form of supplementary bargaining, particularly over work and employment 
practices, within a framework concluded in a multi-employer agreement. In Britain 
developments have gone further, with sectoral bargaining being almost wholly 
displaced by collective agreements at company or at workplace level. One effect is 
that the distinction between consultation within the enterprise and collective 
bargaining beyond is becoming blurred, as employee representatives within the 
enterprise increasingly become involved in second-tier negotiations. To a greater or 
lesser extent amongst large companies, established sectoral and occupational 
frameworks for industrial relations are tending to be paralleled, or in some cases 
superseded, by a corporate framework. The context in which EWCs are being 
established, therefore, is one in which there is substantial pressure from management 
for a continuation of the decentralisation already occurring in collective bargaining 
structures across Europe. Faced with such pressures from management, trade unions 
have rarely been able to resist devolution, in part or in whole, of bargaining to 
enterprise level. It seems unlikely in this context that unions will be prove capable of 
confounding management's priorities and require it to engage in collective 
negotiations at European company level. 
Pressures for a European dimension 
The resilience of national systems of multi-employer collective bargaining in 
many European countries, and the demarcation between consultation within the 
enterprise and collective negotiations beyond; the widespread attachment of trade 
unions to such systems; and the pressures from management, increasingly organised 
along operationally and financially devolved lines, to decentralise bargaining 
structures would seem to make the development of collective bargaining at European 
company level an unlikely prospect in the immediate future. Yet it is possible to 
discern some countervailing pressures towards greater coordination of industrial 
relations and employment practice at European level, most evidently deriving from 
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changes in international product markets and the response of multinational companies 
to these. 
At first sight, it might be expected that European company-level collective 
bargaining would be most likely to arise where a European labour market developed 
for particular groups of workers. In these circumstances, management might see 
advantages in establishing a minimum floor of conditions, through collective 
agreement with trade unions, in order to prevent undercutting. Highly-skilled 
employees, such as technical staff or airline pilots, could become examples, but in 
practice, there is little evidence that a European labour market will develop for most 
groups within the workforce over the foreseeable future. Developments in product 
markets are likely to have more immediate and more widespread implications for 
collective bargaining. 
Intensifying international competition during the 1980s and 1990s reflects 
growing internationalisation of markets for products. Multinational companies have 
been active agents in this process, pressing national governments and 
intergovernmental institutions for measures to open up international markets. Within 
Europe they were influential proponents of the creation of the single market. In turn, 
they have responded by adopting continent-wide strategies for production and the 
servicing of markets across Europe.  These developments in production strategy have 
been accompanied by innovations in management organisation. The primary axis of 
internal organisation is shifting away from the national subsidiary, which groups all 
business operations within a particular country, and towards the international 
business division, which groups operations within the same stream of business across 
different countries. Prominent companies which have shifted the emphasis from 
territorial forms of organisation to international business-based forms of organisation 
include CarnaudMetalBox, General Motors, Shell, Thomson and Unilever. The 
transnational character of the devolved management systems, and the performance 
control and coordination exercised by the corporate centre of major multinational 
companies (MNCs) has important implications for their approaches to industrial 
relations.  
Crucially, these multinational companies now possess the potential to develop 
organisation-based systems of employment which stretch beyond the confines of 
national borders, and which are genuinely transnational in nature. A growing number 
of MNCs have put in place management systems and structures to diffuse best 
examples of working and employment practice across sites in different European 
countries. Such systems include the regular convening of meetings of production and 
personnel managers from sites in different countries, rotation of managerial personnel 
from one site to another, compilation of manuals of best practice and the assignment 
of a corporate management task force with a specific remit to identify and diffuse 
examples of best practice across sites. The emphasis is on implementing work and 
employment practices, tailored to the business requirements of the MNC, on a site-
by-site basis.  The process is reinforced by the systems of performance control 
utilised within major MNCs. Advances in information technology and 
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communications systems mean that corporate, and divisional, management now have 
the capability to compare the performance of workforces from sites across Europe, 
and beyond. Such comparisons are most salient when similar activities are carried out 
in a number of different locations. The information from these performance 
comparisons can be used to exert pressure on business unit management and extract 
concessions in employment and working practices from local workforces, keen to 
attract future investment. In locating new investments, corporate headquarters can 
„reward“ strongly performing sites and „punish“ those performing poorly. The 
exercise of these coercive comparisons provides MNCs with a powerful mechanism 
to discipline the bargaining behaviour of local managements as well as local 
workforces. Thus whilst the parameters of this corporate framework are transnational 
in scope, any negotiation over the implementation of new work and employment 
practices most commonly occurs at either national enterprise or site level. The 
potential to develop transnational organisation-based employment systems has 
translated into explicit policy initiatives in only a few cases. These include companies 
such as Digital and IBM which have developed an overriding philosophy for the 
management of human resources, and Ford which introduced employee involvement 
programmes in similar operations in several European countries under an explicit 
initiative to deal with a common problem. A further exception is French-based 
Danone, which has adopted European-level policies on training, equal opportunities, 
employee information and trade union rights (see box). Unusually, too, these take the 
form of joint opinions agreed with the International Union of Foodworkers through 
the company's EWC. As noted earlier, Danone comes closest to collective bargaining 
at European company level in terms of present practice.  
Danone - the shape of things to come 
The annual meetings between Danone, the French-based group formerly known 
as BSN, and the International Union of Foodworkers (IUF) covering the group's food 
and drink divisions have been the forum for the development of a series of joint texts: 
 a „common viewpoint“ (1988) mapped out a programme of joint policy 
initiatives on specified employment matters.  
This was followed by the conclusion of joint texts on: 
 a „plan for economic and social information“ (1989) 
 an „action programme for the promotion of equality of men and women at the 
workplace“ (1989) 
 a „framework agreement on skills and training“ (1992) 
 a „joint declaration an trade union rights“ (1994) 
Trade unions are already beginning to respond to the increasing coordination of 
apparently decentralised operations being exercised by management within MNCs at 
international level. Most strikingly, the publicity surrounding some instances of 
„regime shopping“ by MNCs has alerted trade unions and employees to the ways in 
which managements are deploying cross-border comparisons of labour performance 
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in their dealings with local workforces. Hoover's 1993 decision to relocate production 
of a particular line from one of its plants in France to one in Scotland is a prominent 
example. Decisions by Mercedes Benz and Siemens to locate investments in major 
new European production facilities outside of Germany have also been interpreted by 
IG Metall and local works councils as coercive moves aimed at securing cost 
reductions in their German operations. In MNCs characterised by ever closer 
integration of production facilities across the European continent, comparisons are 
becoming evident in the local and national bargaining demands of trade unions. For 
example, current claims in the British operations of both Ford and General Motors 
(Vauxhall) base their demands for a reduction in working hours on explicit 
comparison with company practice in other European countries. And French unions 
organising in metalworking plants in Alsace which are closely tied in to the 
operations of their German corporate parents, have launched claims for wage parity.  
The establishment of European Works Councils will reinforce this process as 
increasing international integration of production and service provision and 
accompanying management coordination of working and employment practice across 
countries is stimulating a trade union response. Arguably, it will do so in two ways:  
 first, EWCs mean that management will be under pressure to outline the key 
elements of their business plans. In explaining the rationale behind investment 
and divestment decisions, management will have to make explicit the 
international dimension of its business operations, and the linkages across 
borders which sustain these; and 
 second, EWCs will provide an unprecedented opportunity for employee 
representatives, including in a substantial number of cases union representatives, 
to come together on a regular basis. In those MNCs in which trade unions are 
relatively well organised, the opportunity to meet, exchange information, engage 
in cross-national comparisons of employment conditions and practice and, 
potentially, forge common positions is likely to enhance substantially their 
ability to respond to transnational management initiatives.  
Arm's-length bargaining and framework agreements?  
The establishment of EWCs will facilitate the deployment of cross-national 
comparisons of pay, conditions and working practices by trade unions in collective 
negotiations at national and local levels within MNCs. How will the managements 
of MNCs react? It is possible to foresee greater intervention from international 
management, at corporate or divisional level, to coordinate management policy and 
practice on employment and industrial relations in the individual business 
operations. Otherwise there is the danger that local management might set 
damaging precedents, which trade union representatives could subsequently exploit 
at sites across the enterprise. The overall effect of this „arms-length“ bargaining, in 
which the parties do not formally negotiate at European level, but in which they 
influence and anticipate the reactions of each other, could be a growing 
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convergence in working practice and employment conditions from one European 
country to another. Even pay could be affected if there were a single currency - 
differences in pay levels would become more transparent. In these circumstances, 
EWCs may become the forum for joint opinions or framework agreements on 
aspects of employment and industrial relations policy. Such framework agreements 
would, as has occurred at Danone, establish the broad parameters of policy within 
which negotiations to secure implementation then took place at national or business 
unit level within the enterprise. This „collective bargaining“ would be markedly 
different from the contractual arrangements determining pay and conditions which 
are characteristic of national systems of industrial relations in many European 
countries. It would nonetheless be very important in setting an overall pattern. 
